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Abstract
Considering a large number of vulnerabilities reported in the
news and the importance of elections and referendums, the
general public as well as a number of security researchers
consider paper ballot voting with its fully verifiable paper
trail as more secure than current e-voting alternatives. In this
paper, we add to this discussion and explore the security of
paper voting. Although individual examples of vulnerabilities
of the software used for paper voting were already reported,
this work looks at the cyber-risks in paper voting in a more
systematic manner by reviewing procedures in several coun-
tries and through a case study of Switzerland. We show that
paper voting, as it is implemented today is surprisingly vulner-
able to cyber-attacks. In particular, we show that in different
countries the aggregation of preliminary voting results re-
lies on insecure communication channels like telephone, fax
or non-secure e-mail. Furthermore, we observe that regula-
tions typically do not mandate the use of secure channels.
We further introduce two new attacks: vote report delay and
front-running, both of which can lead to different compro-
mise of election results. Even if preliminary results are later
corrected through paper trail, this 3 to 30 day window during
which incorrect results are perceived as final by the public
has significant influence on financial and political decision
making. An attacker exploiting this inconsistency can, e.g.,
benefit from stock market manipulation or call into question
the legitimacy of the elections. Although our case study fo-
cuses on the example of Switzerland, the attacks and issues
that we report appear to be wide spread. Given recent reports
about easily modifiable preliminary results in Germany and
the Netherlands, we conjecture similar weaknesses in other
countries as well.
1 Introduction
In most modern nations, the process of electing representa-
tives and deciding on critical matters directly through referen-
dums, is essential. Historically, when implemented in stable
democracies, ballot voting where the voters casts their bal-
lots at voting stations is commonly perceived to be secure.
The validity and integrity of ballot voting has been studied
extensively [2, 21, 25, 49]. As the procedure from printing the
ballots, to collecting and counting, and the transmission of
results is slow, cumbersome and prone to errors [26], interest
has shifted to voting machines and e-voting. However, the
security of voting machines and e-voting systems has been
continuously challenged [3, 23, 24]. Most effective attacks
allowed modification of votes and compromise of the vote
counting process. The classic paper ballot voting, while being
much slower, is therefore still seen as a reliable alternative
that is trusted more than its electronic counterparts.
Paper voting is conducted for multiple decades and robust
systems have been established, mostly based on a decentral-
ized vote casting and counting infrastructure. Usually, a lo-
cal result is determined at a local (municipal, county, state)
voting office, followed by a paper report containing the ex-
act counts that is hand-signed by the responsible official(s).
These local results are then sent to the central office where
the final results are calculated. The communication of local
results and/or ballots to the central office (typically via mail
or dedicated transport), and subsequent counting and result
validation can be slow and can take, depending on the country
between 3 to 30 days. This is considered slow and therefore
most countries also allow preliminary result to be published,
in which case local results are typically transmitted using
faster communication channels (e.g., telephone, fax, email).
Recent reports in Germany [33] and the Netherlands [31]
highlight negligent security engineering in widely used vote
counting and aggregation software. We add to this discussion
by systematically reviewing the paper voting process across
several countries and investigating the problems that arise at
the intersection of paper voting and digital transmission of
its result. We show that, in several countries, the aggregation
of preliminary results heavily depend on common computer
technologies and is therefore exposed to a wide range of cyber
attacks, possibly as much as e-voting.
Interestingly, the regulations in the countries considered in
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this work actually do not require that authenticity or integrity
of preliminary voting results is protected. In particular, in our
study we focus on Switzerland, a country that is considered a
stable democracy [50], and where the citizens decide directly
about constitutional changes and controversial laws. This is an
interesting case since referendums are frequent in Switzerland
and official preliminary results are published the same day the
polls close, whereas the final results follow around 10 days
later. Our study shows that the binary outcome of national
referendums in Switzerland can be flipped by changing the
outcome of only a few municipalities.
In addition to simply tampering with the preliminary re-
ports sent by voting stations, we introduce two new attacks:
delaying reports and front-running real reports with fraudu-
lent ones. The impact of these attack vectors may be smaller
than report modification, but they are harder to mitigate.
It might seem that attacks on preliminary results are not
so severe since these modifications will be corrected when
the final results are published (i.e., when the correct results
arrive via dedicated physical channels). We show, however,
that this integrity time-gap between incorrect preliminary
and correct final results can be damaging. It can be used for
stock market manipulation, fraud, reduce the confidence in
the government and democratic processes, or can be used
to delegitimize elected governments and referendum results.
Most people are not aware of the official but much slower
paper-trail and perceive the preliminary results as the final
ones.
The immediate decay of the British Pound after the first
interim result of the Brexit referendum or the risky German
federal election in 2016 (see Section 5.2) highlights the severe
impact that preliminary results have on trade markets and
political decisions. Our work therefore shows that the popular
argument that only the final results are important to protect
no longer holds in today’s fast-paced world.
Outline. We review typical paper voting mechanisms focus-
ing on the aggregation of votes. We investigate the provisions
concerning the transmission of voting reports, followed by
a description of two new attack vectors. Our case study of
Switzerland highlights the (insecure) transmission mecha-
nisms used in paper voting. We further discuss the real-world
impact of fraudulent preliminary results. Finally, we provide
recommendations to improve the security of paper voting.
2 Understanding Paper Voting
Paper voting is the dominant voting mechanism used through-
out most democratic countries. As its name indicates, paper
voting relies on paper ballots, submitted by the voters either
at the polling station or via mail. The counting and the trans-
mission of results is then entirely performed on paper. The
advantages are apparent: the results can be confirmed by veri-
fying the physical paper trail.
There are usually four stages of a vote that result in the final
decision of the voters: the voting (ballot casting), counting,
transmission, and accumulation. In the following, we will
elaborate on these steps in a typical democracy.
Voting. Voting in a paper-based voting scheme is usually con-
ducted by filling out a paper ballot. Some ballots provide
only simple options, e.g., yes and no, while others offer many
choices and even write-ins to specify the name of the pre-
ferred candidate. The procedure of handing in ballots can
widely differ between voting schemes. There are countries
like France where any voter needs to physically go to a vot-
ing station, fill out the voting card, and drop it into a ballot
box [32], while other countries like the United Kingdom [46],
Germany [11], and some states in the US additionally also
allow postal voting. Recently some nations have started to use
machine voting, where the vote is entered into a machine that
produces a count in the end. Some variants of machine voting
do not provide any paper trail, and therefore, do not allow for
a manual recount. However, most voting machines produce a
paper trail as well as a receipt to the voter to verify their vote
was cast correctly. Nevertheless, these machines have been
continuously proven to be insecure [3, 23, 24], allowing the
attackers to modify the vote counts.
Counting. In a paper ballot system, the votes must be man-
ually counted by officials. Before opening the ballot boxes,
unused ballots must usually be removed from the premise
to reduce possible mistakes. Only then the ballot boxes are
opened. Typically, the ballots are first ordered to the respec-
tive decision and then counted manually (in some cases more
than once). In the end, there are some validation checks to
verify correct counting, e.g., verifying the total number of
ballots in a ballot box. Finally, all counts of the various ballot
boxes of one voting station are accumulated, and a report
with the results is compiled. The report, with all irregularities
attached, is hand-signed by the supervising official(s).
Transmission. After the counting, the report must be transmit-
ted to the superior instance as shown in Figure 1. Every office
waits until it has received all results from its subordinates
until it will issue another report summarizing all the results.
This procedure continues until the highest office is reached
– national in some cases, regional in others. Note that this is
a lengthy process since a single straggler can cause signifi-
cant delays. In today’s interconnected world, however, people
want much faster results, which are transmitted electronically
(cf. Section 2.2).
Final Result Once all the reports have reached the final
office, the signatures are verified, and the results are accumu-
lated. After that, the results are published, but they are not
official yet; some time is typically allowed for objections and
requests for recounts before the decision is final.
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Federal
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Figure 1: Simplified vote aggregation infrastructure with Swiss hierarchical levels (districts are called ’cantons’ in Switzerland).
Similar accumulation structures are used in most countries.
2.1 Elections vs. Referendums
Most countries support two kinds of popular votes: elections
to select representatives and referendums to decide on critical
issues. Elections usually have multiple candidates to choose
and sometimes also allow write-ins, to vote for a person that
does not appear on the ballot. A referendum, on the other
hand, usually only allows two answers: yes and no. There are
some countries where additional choices are also available,
but mostly referendums require clear binary decisions for
critical issues (e.g., Brexit [47]).
Referendums and elections can be held for all levels of the
hierarchy shown in Figure 1, e.g., for the election of the city
council, the national parliament, or a referendum on joining
the European Union [9]. Depending on the hierarchy level,
more votes must be transmitted and accumulated over more
levels, leading to larger delays before the result is final. As
representatives are usually elected for and within a district,
there is no need for the federal office to accumulate all counts,
while for a referendum it is – indicated by the dashed lines
in Figure 1. An exception is, for example, the nation-wide
elected president of France, who is elected by popular majority
across all eligible voters in France.
2.2 Cyber in Paper Voting
Paper voting promises purely paper-based procedures. Histor-
ically, the paper voting systems fulfilled the promises, but re-
cent demand for faster notification has led to several electronic
component-replacements. In most countries, the results from
voting stations are transmitted not only via postal mail but
also using electronic communication channels (e.g., E-Mail,
telephone, or specialized software). The results from such an
electronic channel are not regarded as final; nevertheless, they
are forwarded and accumulated to form official preliminary
results. Compared to official final results, counting officials
do not await all results of their subordinates before sending
them on to the next office. After only basic feasibility checks,
preliminary results are immediately forwarded and published
by the highest offices (e.g., by the voting commission). News
agencies use this information just hours after the polls close.
Exit polls are for even earlier projections: voters are asked
for their decision after they have cast their vote. Exit polls
cannot provide accurate estimations of the outcome since vot-
ers can refuse to participate in the survey leading to statistical
uncertainty. However, the results of exit polls can be used
for forecasts before the polls close. Similarly to preliminary
results, exit polling data is usually transmitted electronically
to a central entity that accumulates the results and publishes
projections. Exit polls are typically conducted by private com-
panies, compared to official preliminary results.
Unlike exit polls, which have recently shown to be unre-
liable, preliminary (complete) results are typically accepted
and used as final by the public. Adversarial modification of
the preliminary results can therefore have a much more sub-
stantial impact.
3 Attacks on Preliminary Results
In this section, we investigate the regulations on the trans-
mission of preliminary results in paper voting and highlight
various attack vectors on the insecure communication chan-
nels. We stress that once the paper trail arrives, the fraudulent
preliminary results will be corrected. Nevertheless, prelimi-
nary results can exhibit a lot of influence on the world. While
countries have strong regulations on the paper-trail of an elec-
tion to prevent tampering with the final result, they are not
as concerned about the preliminary results. However, the pre-
liminary results are becoming increasingly significant, often
regarded as final by the public, and they lead to extensive
political and economic consequences. We stress that the prob-
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lem at hand has been mitigated for many years with secure
channels [15, 27], but in practice, many countries are still
vulnerable to attacks on their digital communication of elec-
tion results. Recently, some agencies have started publishing
guidelines for electronic communication in paper voting sys-
tems, e.g., in the United States of America [48]. However, our
inquiries to various election offices indicate that said recom-
mendations are far from being implemented.
3.1 Regulations and Recent Incidents
The regulations on the transmission of (preliminary) re-
sults vary widely across countries. In Germany, Switzer-
land, and Austria, the election laws stipulate how preliminary
results must be collected and transmitted as fast as possi-
ble [11, 17]. However, they do not require any integrity or
authenticity guarantee for the transmitted report. France, Es-
tonia, and the United Kingdom do not define preliminary
results in their laws at all. There, the local results must be
publicly proclaimed in the voting station after the count is fin-
ished [30, 32, 46], where private companies collect the results
and provide the public with preliminary results and projec-
tions. In the United States, the individual states deploy differ-
ent mechanisms; some specify the transmission of preliminary
results while others rely on private companies. In general, no
election law (that we studied) requires any guarantee regard-
ing the integrity or authenticity of electronically transmitted
results. Some countries have published recommendations for
voting systems where various security properties are required.
To the best of our knowledge, however, none of these recom-
mendations are currently implemented in practice.
Recent reports in Germany [33] and the Netherlands [31]
highlight the vulnerable systems in place today. In the Nether-
lands, the results were transmitted entirely electronically with-
out a paper trail unless someone objects the result. In Ger-
many, only the preliminary results could be manipulated since
the paper trail is always sent via paper mail. However, the
Chaos Computer Club demonstrated how preliminary results
for roughly half of the electors of Germany could have been
manipulated due to grossly negligent software practices [33].
3.2 Attack Vectors
We consider counting officials that count perfectly and trans-
mit the correct preliminary and final results. Bribes and ex-
tortion aimed at counting officials are out of scope. The final
result based on the paper trail is always guaranteed to be
correct. Exit polls and preliminary results, however, are trans-
mitted over electronic channels (e.g., VoIP or email) that can
be manipulated. There are various types of communication
channels used around the world, and we will discuss several
attack vectors that might or might not apply the respectively
chosen channel. In certain cases, only a single municipality
that still relies on insecure communication, if altered, can
change close preliminary results of a national election or ref-
erendum (cf. Section 5).
Tampering with Reports. Modifying the in-flight prelimi-
nary results is the most naive attack vector. Converting a few
percents of votes in the report of a single municipality can
easily lead to a swing in the national preliminary result. For
example, swapping the yes and no vote-counts in the prelimi-
nary report will lead to an incorrect total preliminary result.
The modification will be discovered as soon as the paper trail
is processed (or an official notices the mistakes), but until then,
the public will accept the fraudulent result. The adoption of
an authenticated and integrity protected communication chan-
nel would prevent any modification. However, our case study
in Section 4 shows that many constituencies use traditional
communication means, such as telephone and email, and do
not employ appropriate security mechanisms.
Delaying Reports. Any attacker that controls any critical
part of the communication channel (e.g., mail server, inter-
net router, etc.) can delay any transmission of a preliminary
report. The delaying attack becomes even stronger if the ad-
versary is able to learn the delayed results and abuses this
knowledge for individual profit. Even without knowing the
result, one can delay results from a constituency where there
is a strong expectation for a specific outcome. As an example,
an adversary learns from polls that cities are strongly against
a specific proposal while rural areas support it. Delaying the
results from cities change the preliminary totals to dip tem-
porarily in a chosen direction. Analysts will potentially warn
that the results from cities did not arrive yet, but the public
perception might already be affected.
We stress that the delaying attack works for various commu-
nication channels, and even secure channels are vulnerable.
Front-Running with Fake Reports. While a specific voting
office is still counting, a real-looking but maliciously forged
preliminary report could be sent to the accumulating office
before the actual report. If it is accepted as valid, the central
accumulating office will take the fraudulent preliminary re-
sults and forward them to the next higher instance. When the
real preliminary results arrive, the error will most likely be
detected and corrected, but the damage is already inflicted.
The time during which the fraudulent results are considered
as correct might be minimal, but the attacker knows that these
results are fake, and can, therefore, adjust his strategy to profit
from the incident (cf. Section 5). Note that the communica-
tion channel must allow arbitrarily forged messages for the
front-running attack to work.
4 Case Study: Switzerland
We have chosen Switzerland for our case study, a direct
democracy where the people decide on policies directly with
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Canton Eligible Voters [40]
Transmission
Election Referendum
Aargau 414,745 Sitrox [39] Sitrox [39]
Appenzell Ausserrhoden 38,498 B andv B andv
Appenzell Innerrhoden 11,565 B orT B orT
Basel-Landschaft 187,863 B T
Basel-Stadt 113,717 B B
Bern 729,203 Bewas [4] Bewas [4]
Freiburg 196,027 SyGEV [45] SyGEV [45]
Genf 248,915 T T
Glarus 26,268 Sesam [38] B andT
Graubünden 137,126 Sesam [38] Sesam [38]
Jura 51,936 T T
Luzern 271,143 T Sesam [38]
Neuenburg 111,304 SyGEV [45] SyGEV [45]
Nidwalden 30,810 Sesam [38] Sesam [38]
Obwalden 26,244 Sesam [38] Sesam [38]
Schaffhausen 51,036 B orT orv B orT orv
Schwyz 102,145 Wabsti [1] Wabsti [1]
Solothurn 177,292 Wabsti [1] Wabsti [1]
St. Gallen 317,969 Wabsti [1] Wabsti [1]
Tessin 218,580 Votel [29] Votel [29]
Thurgau 206,118 Wabsti [1] Wabsti [1]
Uri 31,928 T and Sesam [38] T and Sesam [38]
Waadt 428,569 Votelec [8] Votelec [8]
Wallis 216,041 adminVotel [16] adminVotel [16]
Zug 74,803 Wabsti [1] B
Zürich 907,623 Wabsti [1] Wabsti [1]
Switzerland 5,283,556 sedex [20] sedex [20]
v Fax.
B Email.
T Telephone.
or Either one required.
and Both simultaneously required.
Table 1: The voting transmission
mechanisms for preliminary results
from municipalities to cantons in
Switzerland as of January 2019, us-
ing their German names. The last row
indicates the transmission mechanism
which is used from the cantonal chan-
celleries to the federal chancellery.
Several cantons like Genf or Jura only
rely on telephone for transmission.
Note that there are 11 different trans-
mission systems leading to a large
attack surface.
5.3M citizens eligible to vote [40], as it has a flexible election
and referendum mechanism with around ten distinct referen-
dums per year. The constitution can only be changed if the
majority of the eligible people accept the change in a nation-
wide referendum. Similar mechanisms are in place to object
laws passed by the two legislative chambers of Switzerland.
Politically, the Swiss federation consists out of 26 states,
so-called cantons. These are politically autonomous, and the
organization of elections and referendums lies within their
sovereignty. Each canton has its own way of conducting and
transmitting voting results, and there is no significant effort
to unify these systems. Table 1 summarizes the cantons of
Switzerland, including the number of eligible voters.
In federal elections, voters elect representatives for every
canton individually. As there is no need for an accumula-
tion of votes on a federal level, the impact of manipulated
preliminary results of elections is limited to the canton’s repre-
sentatives. Nation-wide referendums, however, are aggregated
on the federal level, and a very little change in the outcome of
one canton can flip the result of close referendums completely.
For a change in the federal constitution, a referendum initi-
ated by the people, called popular initiative, has to win two
majorities to pass: the popular majority of all votes of every
participating citizen (German: Volksmehr), and the majority
of the cantons (German: Ständemehr) where the majority of
each (full) canton casts a single vote, 23 votes in total1. A
referendum may win the popular majority due to an advan-
tage in the highly populated cantons but fail to reach cantonal
majority as many smaller cantons rejected the referendum.
With country-side cantons usually having fewer inhabitants,
this leads to a balance between the densely populated urban
cantons and more sparsely populated rural areas.
The final results of the vote are obtained by written paper-
protocols that are signed by multiple members of each vot-
ing station, usually members of several political parties, and
then sent by postal services to the state chancellery. The first
accumulation of the paper report results usually takes 3-5
days, maximal 13 days, followed by an objection period of
3 days [13]. Simultaneous to these final results, there is an
official accumulation of preliminary results, which are usually
1Due to historic reasons, there are 6 cantons with only half a vote, casting
together 3 of these 23 votes.
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published on the day the vote takes place.
Every canton provides its own solution to transmit the
preliminary vote-counts quickly after the finished counting.
These results are often transmitted using several known-to-
be-weak transmission methods like email, telephone, and fax,
which in their common form do not provide message authen-
tication or integrity mechanisms. An overview of the tech-
nologies involved is given in Table 1. Many cantons apply
individual dedicated software for voting results transmission,
which have not passed a public security review. Given that 8
different dedicated software solutions are in use throughout
Switzerland, the potential attack surface is rather large.
While there are severe security risks in the transmission
infrastructure, we do not consider the system in Switzerland
to be at imminent risk of large result deviations. Significant
deviations are likely to be discovered, and the risk of detection
increases with every modification of preliminary results. For
close referendums, however, attacks stay feasible. It is interest-
ing to note that the security in transmission of voting results
in Switzerland is comparable to most other countries (cf. Sec-
tion 3). As we show in the next subsection, manipulating the
result from a few municipalities by a few negligible percent-
age points might be sufficient to flip the result of nation-wide
referendums.
4.1 Attack on Popular Majority
This attack takes place during the vote "Volksentscheid gegen
Asylmissbrauch" (referendum on abuse of the asylum system)
from 24th November 2002 [35]. It was rejected by the popular
majority with 1’119’342 to 1’123’550 votes. In contrast, the
majority of the cantons of the vote was won. To flip the vote
to acceptance, an attacker would need to change only 2104
votes.
We change those votes in the canton Basel-Landschaft (BL)
since it is the largest that uses e-mail to transmit preliminary
voting results. Without an attacker’s action, the referendum
in BL was won with 50.3%. In the case of manipulation, the
vote would have been won as well, but now with 52.7%. With
these minor shifts, the outcome of the federal vote would have
been flipped.
4.2 Attack on Cantonal Majority
The second attack aims to flip the majority of the cantons. We
target the decision on joining the United Nations from 3rd
March 2002 [34]. On the federal level, the decision was won
with 54.6% regarding the popular majority, and 12 cantonal
votes opposed by 11 cantonal votes regarding the majority
of the cantons. If the two majorities do not agree, the vote is
rejected. So the attack only must change a single full cantonal
vote.
We choose to attack the canton of Zug because it is the clos-
est canton that uses email or other non-authenticated methods.
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British Pound Exchange Rate after Brexit
Figure 2: The currency exchange rate of British Pounds vs.
US-Dollar around the Brexit-referendum vote.
Originally, the cantonal vote was won with 55.2%. To flip the
vote to a negative outcome, i.e. a result below 50%, we need
to change only 2’438 of a total of 44’708 votes.
5 Impact of Preliminary Results
While most state-officials claim that a modification attack on
preliminary voting results does not matter – arguing that only
the official accumulation of the hand-signed paper reports
count – the public perceives this differently. In many cases,
the preliminary results are regarded as the final ones, usually
due to ignorance or out of experience that there was never any
significant difference. While from a formal-law viewpoint
negligible, there are extensive decisions taken based on these
preliminary results – for example, reacting stock markets or
foreign currency exchange rates, induced long-term politi-
cal decisions that are taken before the results are final, or
high-frequency trading that reacts immediately on very recent
information. In the case of tampered preliminary results, sig-
nificant harm may already have occurred, even if the fraud
will be detected one or two days later. The confidence in the
voting process might suffer, which can lead to lowered trust
in the democracy in general. Financial decisions based on
false knowledge may bring significant loss, and far-reaching
decisions might require a revocation. We will highlight three
examples where the knowledge of preliminary results already
had significant impact hours or days before the final results
were published.
5.1 Market Insecurity after Brexit
Our first example is the decay of the exchange rate of British
pounds to US-Dollar in the night of the 23rd to 24th June
2016. On that day, the ballots were counted on the referendum
whether the United Kingdom shall invoke article 50 of the
Treaty of the European Union – which would start a two-year
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Figure 3: The price of a troy ounce of gold in US-Dollar. The market is closed on weekends (grey underlays). Quite surprisingly,
the price has fallen significantly over the weekend where the gold referendum of Switzerland took place, indicated by the red
line. The preliminary outcome was approved by the final result several days later.
process ending with UK’s exit from the European Union [47]
– commonly referred to as Brexit. The referendum was finally
accepted with a majority of 51.9% [43].
While the impact of the referendum on the British Pound
was discussed the days before the Brexit referendum, in the
night the votes were counted and the preliminary results were
piece-wise published, the GBP/USD exchange rate fell to a
historic low. Figure 2 illustrates the development. The polls
closed at 22:00 followed by a slight raise of the exchange
rate. After the first election office (Sunderland) announced its
result (EU leave), the exchange rate fell immediately, eventu-
ally reaching the lowest point since 1985. The next morning,
8:15am at 24th June 2016, the prime minister of the United
Kingdom spoke to the public announcing the final results [44].
The exchange rate improved again little bit, but still was over
8% lower than the day before. If the first result would have
rejected the referendum (EU remain), Figure 2 might look
quite differently.
5.2 Federal Elections in Germany 2017
In Germany, there exist official preliminary results that are
publicly announced usually the day the polls close. The fi-
nal results are provided 10 to 30 days later by the Bun-
deswahlleiter (federal election director). Our example, the
2017 federal parliament election took place on the 24th
September 2017, a few weeks after the discovery of severe
vulnerabilities in the vote transmission software (cf. Sec-
tion 3.1). Preliminary results were available the same day, and
the identical final result was approved 19 days later, on the
12th October 2017.
According to the preliminary results, the social democratic
party of Germany (SPD) lost a significant number of seats to
the new right-wing party Alternative für Deutschland. The
SPD lost its previous ability to participate in the parliament’s
major governing alliance. Therefore, they announced party-
internal changes and stated to go into opposition already on
the 24th September [36], not a day after the preliminary results
were published. The next day, insecurities in the stock markets
followed due to the recent change in the country’s power
structure [37]. Four days after the preliminary results, the then
current president of the United States of America, Donald J.
Trump, congratulates the German Chancellor Angela Merkel
for her reelection [7]. Finally, on the 9th October 2017, still
several days before the results were final, the newly formed
government coalition fixed the date they planed to start the
negotiations about their future corporation [42].
While none of these actions were irreversible, they were
all taken before the election results were final, and during the
ongoing public discussion about insecure voting result trans-
mission software (cf. Section 3.1). If, and this was not unlikely
at that time, the preliminary result would have been tampered
with, this could have left a lasting negative impression among
the people of Germany.
5.3 Vote on Gold Reserves in Switzerland
In 2014, Switzerland held a referendum whether the Swiss
National Bank (SNB) is obligated to store 20% of its foreign-
exchange reserves in gold. At that time, the SNB retained only
7.5% of its foreign-exchange reserves in gold and, in case of
acceptance of the referendum, would have been forced to buy
around 1500 metric tons of Gold (worth around 60 Billion
US-Dollar) within the next three years [41]. The referendum
was rejected on 30th November 2014 by a large majority; the
final result followed several days later.
This referendum became a major talking point interna-
tionally. Several News outlets discussed the referendum and
showed its impact on the international gold price [5]. Figure 3
pictures the exchange rate of a troy ounce of gold against
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US-Dollar. The exchange is closed on the weekends, hinted
by the grey underlays in the figure. Usually, the exchange
market opens on Mondays with roughly at the same price as
it has closed the Friday before. This is indicated by the hori-
zontal green lines. In the weekend where the referendum took
place, however, the markets opened with a significantly lower
price, indicated by the red line. Experts attribute this decrease
to the rejection of the referendum [12] whose preliminary
result was published Sunday evening, days before the final
one. In the case of adversarial tampering of the preliminary
outcome, false investments would have followed, the gold
market would have seen increased insecurity and instability,
and the trust into the Swiss democracy would have suffered.
6 Recommendations
The primary issue in all attacks on preliminary voting reports
is the missing authenticity and integrity of the reports trans-
mitted; the broadly used email or telephone do not provide
these properties in their common form. For the transmission
of preliminary voting results, signing the report to allow for
subsequent verification must be mandatory. Moreover, each
preliminary report needs to be uniquely attributed to a specific
election and, in the case of intermediate result publications,
contain a monotonic counted number to avoid ambiguities-
leveraging attacks. Existing systems such as PGP [19] or
TLS [14] already satisfy these requirements and are widely
adopted.
Such technologies rely on asymmetric encryption to ver-
ify the origin of messages based on a public key. If every
vote-counting and aggregation entity holds an individual pri-
vate key to sign its voting-reports, then the validity of any
report can be verified using the corresponding public certifi-
cate. However, the distribution of such trusted certificates is
not trivial. As a possible solution, public Key Infrastructure
(PKI) [10] is a perfect fit for the hierarchical structures in
a typical country: The federal office could provide the root
certificate and sign the certificates of the subordinate districts,
who would then, in turn, sign the certificates of their munic-
ipalities. As long as the report is signed by a key belonging
to the correct certificate, its authenticity can be validated via
the chain of certificates eventually reaching the trusted root
certificate of the federal office. Actually, many countries have
already rolled out a PKI to secure their internal communica-
tion [6, 18].
The private keys belonging to the certificates are critical,
as they allow an adversary to forge signatures on fraudulent
reports. Additionally, any lost or compromised key must be
revoked as soon as possible, which is non-trivial and requires
significant effort. In order to protect the private keys from
leaking, a country could make use of technologies such as
smartcards [28], which encapsulate a private key in a credit-
card like physical device and thereby making key extraction
difficult [22]. The adversary needs to steal the smartcard to
sign fraudulent reports, and a missing smartcard is detected
quickly. Moreover, manipulating an election or referendum
on a large scale would require several cards.
7 Conclusion
This work examines the non-negligible time-gap between pre-
liminary and final results of paper-based voting mechanisms
across several countries. In most countries, the final result of
elections and referendums are determined based on written
down and hand-signed paper-reports of the local results of
each individual voting office, which are sent (by postal ser-
vices) to the next higher aggregation office up to the topmost
level that publishes the final result. As this process usually
takes several days, faster aggregation systems for preliminary
results have emerged, which use insufficiently secured dig-
ital transmission of preliminary voting results. As a result,
the preliminary outcome of elections and referendums can
be modified by an adversary. While this is unlikely for one-
sided referendums or elections, very close decisions can be
flipped by a small distortion of a regional intermediate result.
We have shown this through a case-study of Switzerland, and
given the reports about the software vulnerabilities of aggrega-
tion systems in Germany and the Netherlands, we conjecture
similar issues in many other countries as well.
While tampering with preliminary results should be dis-
covered at the latest when aggregating the final results, we
have discussed the substantial impact of modified preliminary
results with several examples. In the case of the marginal
Brexit referendum – 51.9% voted for leaving the EU – the
value of the British Pound crashed after the publication of
the first preliminary result. In contrast, the market might have
reacted differently if the first result would have proclaimed
"EU stay."
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